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ACCOMMODATION BY DECLARATION
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
I.
In 1994, in an attempt to devote more time to equal protection
and due process in the required first year Constitutional Law course,
I decided to teach federalism by using one problem. That problem
was taken from the facts recited by the lower court in United States
v. Lopez.! (Little did I know.) The discussion, as I recall, took about
two days and was rather ho-hum, except for the occasional observation about how terrible it was that the Court allowed the big bad federal government to take over our very being. The classroom debate
is now anything but boring. The result is that I am currently spending more time on federalism than I did before attempting to move on
to bigger and better things. Indeed, I am now considering adding
several days of additional time to the federalism discussion and introducing students to the Eleventh Amendment, something that before the Court's 1999 Term, I was content to leave to those who
taught Federal Courts.
Upon reflection, I suppose that no one should be surprised by
the renewed interest in states' rights, or federalism if you will. African Americans are no longer enslaved, nor do states subject them to
the indignities of Jim Crow laws as they did thirty years ago. Consequently, the worst of states' rights history is just that-history. The
centralizing forces of the Great Depression and four major overseas
military conflicts, including two world wars, have been demagnetized, at least for the moment. On the other side, factors such
as an increasingly diversified citizenry and the unfulfilled promises
of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society have prompted some to question
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. My gratitude to
Bill Marshall for those endless informal conversations that challenged me to
constantly rethink my views of federalism.
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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a "one size fits all" approach to our social and economic ills. What
is surprising is the central role the Court has played in reversing the
steady march of federal authority that has occurred since 1937, when
the Court took the first step in leaving to Congress the question of
how much centralized authority is appropriate.2 In Lopez, the Court,
while not necessarily limiting the substantive scope of federal commerce powers, held that where Congress regulates activities that are
not evidently commercial and seem to fall within areas "ordinarily"
regulated by the states, the basis for that regulation will be carefully
scrutinized. Moreover, in a case that all but exhumed The SlaughterHouse Cases,3 the Court, largely for federalism reasons, limited
Congress's substantive power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a power that explicitly can be exercised directly against
the states.4 The constitutional basis for these limitations on federal
legislative authority is the Tenth Amendment, or at least the spirit of
state autonomy, which that amendment embodies. By limiting federal legislative/policy-making authority, the Court has necessarily increased the reahn in which state policy choices hold sway.
Not only has the Court used federalism to draw a tighter noose
around congressional ends, it has employed the rhetoric of federalism
to limit as well the means by which Congress can enforce policies
that are otherwise within its constitutional domain. It has held that
concerns for state autonomy prohibit Congress from mandating that
states use their legislative or executive resources to enforce federal
law.5 Most recently, the Court has prohibited Congress from using
its Article I powers to enlist either the federal or the state courts to
require state compliance with federal obligations lawfully imposed
upon them. 6 As a result, a Maine probation officer who was
2. Eric Waltenburg and Bill Swinford have described the recent foray into
the federalism thicket as "the Court's participation in the federalism equivalent
of manifest destiny." ERIc N. WALTENBURG & BILL SWINFORD, LITIGATING
FEDERALISM: THE STATES BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 6 (1999).
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
4. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997).
5. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (discussing executive
resources); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (discussing legislative resources).

6. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (discussing state courts);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (discussing federal courts).
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underpaid by a state agency may not seek compensation in the form
of back pay. Subject to one (inadequate) exception I will mention
below, he must be satisfied with a prospective order prohibiting the
state's department head from further violating the federal standards.
He may not be made whole.
The Court in Alden v. Maine7 did not cite the Tenth Amendment
to limit federal legislation that encroaches on state autonomy.
Rather, the Court relied on the Eleventh Amendment, presumably
because that amendment says something about the exercise of judicial power. It does not matter that the Eleventh Amendment says
nothing about congressional power, much less about citizens suing
their states of residence in state courts in order to rectify clear violations of a valid federal law. The Court, first in Seminole Tribe and
later in Alden, held that state sovereign immunity, confirmed but not
conferred by the Eleventh Amendment, protects the states from all
nonconsensual private suits, except those in which the United States
is the plaintiff. According to the Court, not only was this part of the
original design, 8 but it is also a necessary element of a larger structural principle that protects state autonomy. 9 If Congress had the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity at will, an "unwarranted
strain [would be placed] on the States'
ability to govern in accor10
citizens."
their
of
dance with the will
Odd? Indeed it is. Without violating a state's autonomous right
to govern, Congress may obligate it to conform to federal standards,
for example by requiring that its employees be paid the federally prescribed minimum wage. Congress, however, crosses the line when it
enlists a federal or state judicial system to enforce that obligation.
While I do not doubt that the Constitution operates on congressional
means as well as congressional ends, its application in a case like Alden turns the sovereign immunity child into the autonomy parent.11
This Constitutional inversion and Justice Souter's response,
prompted me to re-read Professor Calvin Massey's ten-year-old,
7. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
8. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
9. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 117
(1984); Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2264-66.
10. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
11. See id. at 2269-70 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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pre-Seminole Tribe, article in which he argued that what is currently
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity doctrine ought to be reconsidered and analyzed under Tenth Amendment autonomy principles. 12 This, he argued, would make sense of the line of Eleventh
Amendment cases dating back to Hans v. Louisiana.13 It would also
provide an analytical framework for future cases in which the federal
judiciary is asked to vindicate federal law against violating states.
Because I agree with Professor Massey, some of what I say here
will add little to his arguments. But I hope to discuss it in a somewhat different way. Let me begin, however, by disclaiming being a
doctrinal purist. I could live with all of the Court's century-old bad
history and analytical incoherence if what the Court has accomplished is what it promised-an "acceptable" accommodation between state autonomy 14 and "the effective supremacy of rights and
powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution."'" Unfortunately, I
am not persuaded that it has. 16 Rather, the Court has seemingly accomplished what the anti-federalist Framers and the states of Virginia 17 and Maryland 18 could not:19 a general distrust of federal
12. See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 passim (1989). Professor David Shapiro
made the same observation five years earlier, although he did so only in passing. See David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 62 & n.5 (1984).
13. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
14. There is certainly a difference between state autonomy and state sovereign immunity. However, I will not discuss the difference in this short paper
except to say that the latter is not necessary to achieve the former. As the Supremacy Clause implies (if not directly expresses), states in a federal system
can be autonomous and still be subject to a "higher" law. Solecism or not, this
is the essence of imperium in imperio. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof FederalismAfter Garcia, 1985 SuP.
CT. REV. 341 passim (criticizing the continued use of "sovereignty" as descriptive of state autonomy).
15. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part, and dissenting in part).
16. For the opposite view, see William P. Marshall, UnderstandingAlden,
RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming).
17. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
19. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw, 79
VA. L. REV. 633, 675-81 (1993) (commenting on the similarity between Justice O'Connor's reasoning in New York v. United States and that of Judge Ca-
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legislative power coupled with a reborn faith in state government
bound together with a constitutional ribbon that we call federalism.
The Eleventh Amendment's role in this reinvigorated constitutional
federalism is analagous to that which the Due Process Clause played
after The Slaughter-House Cases effectively read the Privileges or
Immunities Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the Tenth
Amendment is not read to protect the states' autonomy because prior
judicial decisions have granted such a wide berth to Congress under
Article I, the Eleventh Amendment will suffice to deny Congress the
power to enforce its policies against the states.
Part II outlines what I perceive to be the most persuasive reasons
for limiting congressional enforcement powers against the states
while leaving the scope of its substantive powers untouched. Part II
also describes why those arguments are either unpersuasive or do not
serve to distinguish Eleventh Amendment immunity from Tenth
Amendment autonomy or both. In Part III, I suggest that accommodation of state autonomy and federal authority can be accomplished
better by focusing the Eleventh Amendment inquiry on judicial
remedies. Doing so will bring about a more realistic judicial investigation of both the federal and state interests. It will also be more in
line with the Court's own description of the Eleventh Amendment's
place in our constitutional structure-assuring a certain degree of
state autonomy from the exercise of federal judicial authority. Finally, concentrating on the intrusiveness of the remedy rather than
the status of the parties might introduce into the mix the John Aldens
of the world, so often forgotten when courts and law professors argue
over and decide cases on great universal structural principles.
II.
For analytical convenience, I divide the arguments supporting
current Eleventh Amendment doctrine into three categories: (A) arguments of political processes; (B) arguments of results or effects;
and (C) arguments of structure. There is one supporting argument I
will avoid commenting upon even in passing-state sovereign immunity only mirrors the same sovereign immunity afforded to the
federal government. This is a very complicated argument, one which
bell of the Virginia Court of Appeals in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee).
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packs a variety of constitutional and other assumptions beneath its
facial simplicity. It demands a separate and thorough analysis well
beyond the point I want to make here.
A.
The link between requiring state institutions to respond to federal dictates (the autonomy concern) and fracturing lines of political
accountability was first raised by Justice O'Connor, dissenting in
part in FERC v. Mississippi.20 Justice O'Connor's special brand of
process federalism later became the rationale for the Court's anticommandeering rule in New York v. United States21 and Printz. It
even found its way into Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United
States v. Lopez,22 even though the issue was preemption, not commandeering. All four cases, it should be emphasized, were Tenth
Amendment autonomy cases. Despite this, the political accountability argument reappeared in Alden,23 purportedly an Eleventh
Amendment case.
It takes some doing, but the argument can be understood (it may
even be sensible) when raised in the Tenth Amendment context of
federal enlistment of state agencies, be they legislative or executive.
When the federal government requires state legislatures to enact particular federal programs or state executive officers to enforce those
programs, states lose the ability to set their own legislative agendas
and determine the activities where their officers will spend their energy (and presumably their taxpayers' money). Moreover, requiring
state policymakers to implement federal law confuses local voters as
to whose judgments are being enforced and why. There is thus no
one to credit for success and no one to blame for failure. In addition,
because those who are elected by one constituency (local) are required to respond to another (national), it is easy for local officials,
legislative or executive, to escape political responsibility for their
20. 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
22. 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor, it should be noted, was the only other signatory to Justice Kennedy's opinion. See id. at 568.
23. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2264-65 (1999).
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actions by blaming a higher authority. This not only confuses local
voters, but frustrates them as well, because access to the channels of
change must be shared.with a variety of other interests.24 It is even
possible to understand the political accountability argument in the
preemption setting of Lopez, although preemption is the Court's preferred remedy for the political accountability difficulty in the commandeering cases. A national polity simply should not be making
decisions that affect only a local constituency.
It is hard to understand, however, why the political accountability argument, even assuming its constitutional foundation, 25 applies
to questions of sovereign immunity. Certainly there can be no doubt
about whom deserves the credit or the blame when a federal court
orders a state to accept responsibilities imposed by federal law. This
is particularly true when the federal legislation imposing responsibility on the states is the very same legislation that enlists the courts to
enforce it. Alden presents a different problem only because Congress
enlisted courts other than federal ones to enforce its laws. But however weak the historical basis is (1) for constitutional sovereign immunity26 and (2) for Congress's inability to enlist the aid of state executive officers in enforcing federal law, 27 the notion that the
Framers did not contemplate that state courts would be the primary
24. This branch of the political accountability argument is not peculiar to

federal constitutional law. Before the turn of the century, it was used by supporters of municipal home rule who sought to free local constituencies from
largely unresponsive state legislatures and to add a measure of political responsibility to the actions of locally elected municipal officers. See, e.g., Terrance
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 656 (1964) (describing a phenomena called
"municipal pussyfooting" (quoting LEPAWSKY, HOME RULE FOR
METROPOLITAN CHICAGO xv (1935))).
25. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
Printz and Principle?,111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2200-01 (1998).
26. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 515 (1978) (suggesting
"that sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine, and is not constitutionally
compelled").
27. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, The
Tenth Amendment, and the FederalRequisition Power: New York v. United
States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 355, 374-79 (1998) (concluding
that the historical record supports the argument that federal power to requisition state revenue officers survived the Constitution).
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judicial enforcer of federal law is even weaker. Maybe this is why
the Court in Alden chose not to rely explicitly on the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering rule of Printz.
The Tenth Amendment political accountability argument can
only be understood in an Eleventh Amendment setting by considering an exception to it: the ability of the federal government itself to
sue the states to obtain either retroactive monetary or prospective
injunctive relief. If the federal government believes that a state's
policy is sufficiently disruptive of national interests, it will do
something about it in the same way that the Court would require
Congress to directly regulate the storage of low level nuclear waste
or have the executive enforce the Brady Bill. Conferring a private
right of action against the states, so the argument goes, simply allows
the federal government to avoid that difficult political choice.
There are some pragmatic answers to the argument that will be
discussed below. But even conceptually, the argument is troubling.
The question posed by Seminole Tribe and Alden, it must be repeated, is not whether Congress exceeded its delegated powers and
entered an area that is of only limited and local interest. Whatever
one may think of federal hegemony, Alden was not Lopez. Political
accountability thus rested precisely where it should have-with the
national legislature. Indeed, to suggest that political accountability
demands state sovereign immunity, despite the fact that Maine
thumbed its nose at a national constituency with respect to an issue
that is concededly within the nation's interest, turns McCulloch v.
Maryland on its head.
The anti-commandeering principle does not work well either. In
the context in which that principle became constitutional law, the
state institutions, the legislature in one case, New York, and the executive in the other, Printz, were asked to govern their own citizens
according to some other sovereign's dictates. By contrast, in Alden,
the state courts were asked only to do what the Supremacy Clause
explicitly requires-to enforce a valid federal law. In terms of political accountability, it should not matter whether the enforcement
runs against an individual (which is permissible under the Eleventh
Amendment) or against the state itself.
There is a second political process argument, however, focusing
on the political forces to which Congress responds. Broad Eleventh
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Amendment protection is needed for the same reason broad Tenth
Amendment protection is needed-we cannot trust Congress to do
the right thing by the states. Congress will jump at the chance to
claim credit, with no downside risk of blame for failing, or to avoid
blame, by laying responsibility upon a state institution. 28 Moreover,
we cannot place our faith in a clear statement rule because that rule
only assures that state sovereign immunity will not be abrogated by
accident. The problem with Congress is not that it is accidentally abrogating the states' sovereign immunity.
While I would hope for better, there is enough recent evidence
that when political pressures mount for the federal government to do
something, Congress will either ignore the states and their governance role or use the states to avoid spending scarce national resources.29 But even if we assume that national politicians will respond more to centripetal than centrifugal forces, why do we not
assume that local politicians will respond in exactly the same selfinterested manner? Alexander Hamilton certainly did.30 And, the
actions of Louisiana 31 and Virginia 32 (to name just a few) demonstrated that Hamilton was correct. More importantly, is there something in the Constitution that tells us to presume that Congress will
be less respectful of the states' interests than the states will be of national concerns? 33 Finally, even if one accepts that the states will be
more respectful of federally enacted norms than the federal government will be of state autonomy (because they are possibly less

28. This is what Professor Marshall calls the "Accountability" argument.
See Marshall, supra note 17.
29. See, e.g., Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The
JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979) ("'federalizing' the machinery of state government to serve the ends of national policy"); William
Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failuresof Process Federalism,

22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 140 (1998) (noting a 60-year congressional
"carte blanche on federalism matters"). But see Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994) (claiming the process guarantees states "a voice in the national political process").
30. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 88-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry

Cabot Lodge ed., 1888).
31. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
32. See Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884).
33. The answer, of course, is no. Indeed, it is quite the opposite, as the judicial history of the dormant Commerce Clause demonstrates.
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subject to capture by minority special interests?), what do the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity add to that assumption
that the Tenth Amendment has not already accounted for?
Doctrinally, one must argue that the Eleventh Amendment adds
a separate and quite distinct dimension to our concerns about federal
hegemony. Professor Massey, in other words, was wrong when he
concluded that the autonomy principles of the Tenth Amendment
were sufficient to insulate the states from Congress's use of overly
intrusive means (such as enlisting federal and state judicial systems)
to realize their policy objectives. 34 The difficulty is that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not do that. The Eleventh Amendment's
text only deals with a certain defined set of claims based on the
status of the parties. The rest is judicial gloss, a gloss wholly dependent upon one's view of the broader principles of federal/state
relations. 35 The response is thus circular.
There is another, stronger response. If, as Hans v. Louisiana
held, the Eleventh Amendment reaffirms the original understanding
that state sovereign immunity was not altered by Article III of the
Constitution, that understanding would be meaningless if Congress
could create jurisdiction adjunct to its Article I powers. I will not
deal with this argument by questioning whether Hans reached the
correct conclusion; volumes have been written on that subject. The
difficulty with the argument, certainly conceptually if not pragmatically, is that the exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment have all but
swallowed up the autonomy/sovereignty rationale. It violates a
state's sovereign right to be free from private lawsuits in some foreign courts (the federal and their own courts) but not in others (the
courts of other states).36 It violates a state's sovereign immunity to
34. See Massey, supra note 13, at 143-44 (Tenth Amendment autonomy
recognizes state sovereign immunity except where the people of the nation
have abrogated that immunity in the Supremacy Clause or through national
legislation).
35. Cf.Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2255 ("This separate and distinct structural
principle is not directly related to the scope of the judicial power established by
Article III, but inheres in the system of federalism established by the Constitution.").
36. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1979). The Alden majority
distinguishes Hall by deciding that our constitutional structure protects state
autonomy from the federal government, not from the governments of other
states. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2258-59. With all due respect, that is just plain
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force it to justify its actions to a federal judge in a suit by an individual but not in a suit by the federal government, even if the federal
government is asserting a claim that by all rights belongs to an individual. It is unbecoming for a sovereign state to be required to appear before a federal district court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, but it is not so unbecoming to require an appearance before
nine Supreme Court Justices in the exercise of either their appellate
or, in some limited cases, original jurisdiction. I could go on, but the
point is clear: the Eleventh Amendment is hopelessly underinclusive
in its protection of state sovereign immunity. And, it is underinclusive for exactly the reason given by Justice Powell in Pennhurstand
Justice Kennedy in Alden. Rather than protecting sovereign immunity for its own sake, the Eleventh Amendment attempts to accommodate the constitutional sovereignty/autonomy interests of the state
and the constitutional requirement of the supremacy and uniformity
of federal law. Therefore, to suggest that state immunity from suit to
enforce federal law is an inquiry peculiar to the Eleventh Amendment is to confuse the tail with the dog. Moreover, it is an assertion
that depends, for its validity, on consequentialist rather than conceptual considerations. I now turn to those arguments.
B.
The argument from effects is simple. Current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, taken as a whole, allows for the vindication of
the most important federal rights while at the same time preserving
the dignity of the states qua states. Thus, if one looks at the result of
the doctrine, not only an acceptable, but also a laudable, accommodation of federal supremacy and state sovereignty has been reached.
Moreover, the structural formalism of the Court's analysis in cases
like Seminole Tribe and Alden has reached that accommodation in a
clear and understandable way. The accommodation may be clear. It
is debatable, however, whether "acceptable" properly characterizes
the outcome.

silly. If the states were profoundly shocked by Chisolin v. Georgia, they
would have taken up arms had they known that Nevada v. Hall was in the offing. See Gary J. Simson, The Role ofHistory in ConstitutionalInterpretation:
A Case Study, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 253, 263-64 (1985).
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The claim that we have reached an acceptable accommodation
between state sovereignty and federal supremacy is based on four
exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment. First, federal supremacy is
ensured by permitting an individual to enjoin a state officer from enforcing a statute that violates federal law.37 Second, the United
States can sue to enforce federal law both prospectively and retrospectively.38 Third, Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity when exercising its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 39 The third affords the full panoply of remedies for the
bulk of constitutional infringements by the state of individual freedoms, while the first effectively precludes the state (since the state
can only operate through its officers) from violating federal law in
the initial instance. Moreover, if all else fails, as is the case after Alden, the federal government can always sue the state either to enjoin
further violations of federal law or to recover past due benefits. Finally, these remedies are in addition to judicial actions against a
state's political subdivisions and administrative remedies available
under federal grant programs to require state compliance with federal
law and regulations.
To test the proposition that "the system ain't broke so there is no
need to fix it '40 look at John Alden and his fellow probation officers
who were paid less than what Congress had determined they were
entitled to, a determination that the Court previously held Congress
was entitled to make and apply against the states.41 What can they
now do about being underpaid? They could certainly go to the state,
their boss, and say, "you've made a mistake in calculating our overtime. Why don't you just do the right thing, pay us what you owe us,
stop doing it in the future and we can all go home happy?" I assume
they did that before filing suit and it did not work. And why should
it have worked? The state could have reasonably decided that Seminole Tribe precluded a lawsuit in federal court. Moreover, Edelman
37. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908).
38. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642-46 (1892).
39. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
40. This is essentially Professor Marshall's argument. See Marshall, supra
note 17; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment
and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47,49 (1998).
41. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530
(1985).
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v. Jordan42 insulated the state treasurer or whomever from personal
liability since the "real party in interest" in such a suit would be the
state, not the individual officer. So why pay Alden and his colleagues when the money could be used for other purposes or to benefit others with more political clout? The only risk was that the Court
would distinguish Seminole Tribe on the ground that the Eleventh
Amendment referred only to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It
is, after all, an amendment directed specifically at the jurisdiction
granting provisions of Article III. But the Court has not paid any attention to the Eleventh Amendment's text (or its history for that
matter) since 1890. And because the composition of the Court had
not changed since Seminole Tribe, Maine would have been safe in
concluding that it could get away with determining that others were
more deserving of state funds than John Alden et al.43
Perhaps the state of Maine should not be so cocky. The federal
government might become sufficiently incensed by the flaunting of
its substantive norms, norms that may constitutionally be applied to
the states, that it may sue on behalf of Alden and his colleagues to
recover their back wages. Certainly, that is plausible. The federal
government has sued states and local governments over civil rights
violations. But the political dynamics of suing states for violations
of civil rights are not the same as those that operate when the federal
government is forced to sue for violations of an individual's statutory
entitlements enacted for reasons of national economic uniformity or
efficiency. The state's rights card was long ago played in the discrimination setting, and it was trumped on both moral and legal
grounds. Few in Congress are willing to hold the Justice Department
hostage to a state's claim that it has the right to discriminate against
minorities in the state. On the other hand, assuming that the Department of Labor has the resources to pursue individual actions against
42. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
43. Apparently this was not Maine's reasoning. See infra note 73. But, had
it been (or might it be in the future) the result in Alden would have been no different. In Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), decided the same day as Alden, the
allegation was that "Florida Prepaid [the state] had willfully infringed [College
Savings'] patent.., as well as contributed to and induced infringement." Id. at
2203 (emphasis added). So much for Justice Kennedy's faith that the states
will do the right thing. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999).
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recalcitrant states (which it does not),44 my suspicion is that it would
take only one suit to get appropriations bottled up in the next budget
go around or have major policymakers spending days/weeks from
their appointed tasks testifying before congressional committees.
Justice Kennedy argued that this is as it should be.4 5 Congress
gets off cheaply by imposing obligations on states and then delegating to private parties the task of ensuring the states will abide by
those obligations. The proof of the political pudding is whether
Congress is willing to ante up and whether the executive is willing to
pay the political price to enforce those obligations. Unfortunately,
the argument takes the human being out of the calculus by assuming
that the dispute is purely institutional in nature. Mr. Alden and his
colleagues were the ones harmed by the state's actions. Not only
were they harmed financially by the state, but they are now harmed
politically by the Court's attempt to throttle Congress's corrective
attempt. Alden (and all future Aldens) must not only jump through
the political hoop of securing enactment of the substantive requirements and their extension to the states, but he must also win a second
political battle, persuading the executive branch to enforce those
standards against the states. Moreover, the federal government's attempt to enforce its constitutionally permissible norms is not likely to
be decided by majority vote. More probably, it is going to be decided by a combination of who wields power over the particular enforcement agency and logrolling. If that is true, there will in fact be
no determination that the benefits to the nation of enforcing the policy against the states are worth the political fallout. The process will
not let it get to that stage.
Notwithstanding, the United States may not be able to sue
Maine for back wages in any event. It is certainly true that Alden's
dictum assures us that such a suit is permissible under the Eleventh
Amendment. 46 But a similar suit was tried once before when the
states of New York and New Hampshire sued Louisiana to recover
monies owed by the latter state on bonds held by residents of the
plaintiff states. The Court held that since the real parties in interest
were the individuals, and not the plaintiff states, the suit was
44. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2292-93 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 2267.
46. See id.
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precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. 47 Of course, there are differences, most prominently that the prospective plaintiff is the federal government and not another state. But why should that matter?
In either event, the United States is only a surrogate to enforce what
is, in fact, a private right of action. To use the language of New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, it is little more than a collection agent. 48 In
addition, if the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from using
its Article I powers to abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, as Seminole Tribe and Alden hold, why should it not equally
prohibit the executive from waiving the state's sovereign immunity
simply by fiat? Whatever one may say about the effect of the Seventeenth Amendment on the states' influence on Congress, they have
even less structural influence on the executive, the electoral college
notwithstanding. Consequently, both for doctrinal and practical reasons, if I were Mr. Alden, I would not hold up much hope that the
U.S. Labor Department will unlock the door to my back wages.
Why not argue that the Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted to
provide individuals with a minimum standard of living and to ensure
that employers would not impose onerous employment conditionsarguably basic human rights-or at least allow Congress to so find?
The Maine probation officers could then take advantage of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.4 9 Unfortunately, Congress never said that it was
relying on its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
when it enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act or when it later applied
it to the states. This was an exercise of the commerce power and
thus governed by Seminole Tribe, not Fitzpatrick. But even if Congress had said or were to say that a living wage is a basic human
right, a denial of which is a violation of the Due Process Clause of
47. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883).
48. See id. at 82-83. That also seems to be Professor Evan Caminker's
tentative conclusion. Although, to make his point about qui tam actions, he
decides not to resolve the issue. See Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REv. 92, 113-119 (1999). But
cf. Jonathan R. Seigel, Congress'sPower to Authorize Suits Against States, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 44, 85-86 (1999) (arguing that the Court should uphold
qui tam actions against states but is unlikely to do so). The Supreme Court had
the opportunity to resolve the constitutional issue but chose instead to hold that
the state is not a "person" within the meaning of False Claims Act. See Vermont Natural Resources v. United States, 68 U.S.L.W. 4399 (2000).
49. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not likely that the Supreme Court
would respect that judgment. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court
struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because Congress extended religious freedoms beyond what the Court had held to
be specially protected under the First Amendment. 50 Even Congress's remedial powers, once thought to be rather broad, now seem
to be less than that. In Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,51 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion might well be read to say that Congress can only exercise its Section 5 remedial powers when there is evidence of pervasive state violations of constitutionally protected rights. 52 Again,
John Alden seems out of luck.
What is wrong with enjoining the appropriate state department
heads from continuing to violate the overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act? That may not work either. Professor Vicki
Jackson has speculated that the Court's reasoning in Seminole Tribe
could well lead to a narrowing of Exparte Young, particularly when
a state statute or policy violates only a federal statute.53 Alden's
laundry list of avenues still open to enforce state compliance with
federal law does nothing to quiet Professor Jackson's fears. In this
regard, the opinion mentions Ex parte Young only in passing and
actions
even then says only "[t]he rule . ..does not bar certain
54
relief.",
declaratory
or
injunctive
for
against state officers
C.
What then are the realistic possibilities that John Alden will ever
receive his just rewards? Probably slim to none. But maybe that is
simply the price one must pay for living in a federalist system. There
50. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); see also Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 637 (2000) (holding Congress's prohibitions must be proportionate to what the Court has declared to be unconstitutional behavior).
51. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
52. See id. at 2207. See, e.g., Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649 (stating "Congress

never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States ....).
53. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment and
the PotentialEvisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 530-38
(1997).

54. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267 (emphasis added).
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has always been an individual cost to living in a republic that divides
legislative authority between two sovereigns. Mr. Barron lost his
dock to the actions of the city of Baltimore and never received payment.5 5 Butchers in New Orleans were left to their state remedies if
they wanted to practice their profession outside the state sanctioned
slaughterhouse monopoly. 56 And children in poor Texas school districts could not assert the Equal Protection Clause in order to equalize their educational opportunities.57
Justice Kennedy's declaration that "[t]he principle of sovereign
immunity as reflected in our jurisprudence strikes the proper balance
between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty
of the States" 58 falls neatly and comfortably within that federalist
tradition. It is, however, little more than a political determination,
for it is dependent upon one's views of that balance rather than upon
some clear constitutional or precedential directive. The political or,
to be more charitable, judgmental quality to the Court's declaration
is demonstrated both by the consistency of the dissents in federalism
cases over the past two decades and the empirical studies of social
scientists which demonstrate that federalism doctrine ebbs and flows
with the make-up of the Court. 59 In other words, the appropriateness
of the balance in Alden is a policy determination by the Court that
Maine's ability to ignore federal standards (because there is no effective mechanism to require its compliance) is more important than
John Alden's ability to recover what is, under the law, due him. I am
not saying that reasonable people cannot reach that conclusion-they
can. But in order to do so, one must balance not only two competing
institutional concerns, as the Court does, but also the institutional
concern of ensuring some degree of state autonomy against the individual's statutory right to be paid a living (or close to a living)
wage.
This is so because (to repeat once again) the Court has
55. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251 (1833).
56. See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1873).
57. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,44 (1973).
58. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
59. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1304, 1308-13 (1999).
60. This overstates Alden's claim. He claimed the state violated the maximum hour provisions. See Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246. But, the result would be
the same had the state paid Alden three dollars per hour or required him to
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already confirmed Congress's power to (1) create the statutory right
to a minimum wage and (2) apply that requirement to the states.
Consequently, if there is any "unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,"61 it occurred when Congress extended the Fair Labor Standards Act to the
states. Unless, of course, Congress created unduly intrusive remedies to enforce that obligation. It is that issue to which the concluding section of this paper now turns.
III.
A number of years ago I argued that there was a better way of
accommodating individual interests with concerns for state autonomy. Rather than narrow the right, we should look instead at the intrusiveness of the remedy. 62 This would not only account for the
constitutional interest of state autonomy, but would do so without
undue cost to the individual or to Congress's remedial powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. I would argue that in cases
like Seminole Tribe and Alden, where Congress has the admitted
right to impose obligations directly on states, we consider the same
approach. Put another way, the appropriate inquiry is not whether
providing a private right of action to enforce constitutionally acceptable obligations imposed upon the states violates our more general
63
concern for protecting state autonomy from federal overreaching.
Rather, it is whether the remedy afforded to enforce those lawfully
imposed obligations is too intrusive on legitimate state interests,
given the individual right that is asserted. Put simply, the Court's
solution is too broad for the problem.
Part of the reason for the Court's overbroad response may be its
formalist approach to constitutional interpretation. But, as I will note
below, formalism has been compromised when necessary to reach a
"correct" result. The Court in Alden also posits that broad sovereign
immunity protects "the States' ability to govern in accordance with
the will of their citizens," most particularly "the allocation of scarce
work fourteen hours a day at straight time.
61. Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2264.
62. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties:
Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723, 771 (1979).
63. But see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1979) (holding that if
California's policy were not enforced, its sovereignty would be intruded upon).
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,,64 But that rationale is inconsistent with Milliken v. Bradley,65

...

Nevada v. Hall,66 and New York v. United States,67 to say nothing of

the other exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment noted above.
That leaves the states' dignity, 68 which I take to mean the symbolic side of a state's autonomy. Dignity explains the rule that if
states are to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
courts they must do so explicitly; a state's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts will not suffice. Dignity also explains why
the state itself may not be made a party to an injunctive proceeding,
although its policies (even its fiscal policies) can be rendered meaningless by prohibiting a state officer from enforcing them. It may
even explain why political subdivisions of the state are not afforded
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 69 It does not explain Nevada v.
Hall, but nothing about the Eleventh Amendment explains that case
except the text, which the Court persistently disclaims being important. However, even accepting that a state's dignity deserves constitutional status, why must the dignity of the state always trump the
dignity of the individual in a system where, also constitutionally, the
70
ultimate "sovereigns" are those very same individuals?
I would argue that it should not. Rather, constitutional state
sovereign immunity should depend on a number of factors. What
has Congress said of the importance of individual interests versus
those of the states? Is the jurisdiction of the court invoked pursuant
to a general grant of federal question jurisdiction, as it was in Hans v.
Louisiana,7 1 or has Congress made a separate decision that the individual entitlement at issue is sufficiently important to require a distinct private right of action? Is the nature of the individual interest
64. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
65. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
66. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
67. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress can impose monetary liability on states under Article I so long as it imposes the same liability on private individuals for the same conduct).
68. See id. at 163-64.
69. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should PoliticalSubdivisions Be Accorded
Eleventh Amendmentnlmmunity?, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 577, 589-91 (1994).
70. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.

1425, 1480-81 (1987).
71. 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)).
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asserted sufficiently protected by prospective relief, such that damage relief can be denied without undue harm to the individual? By
analogy to the Dormant Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment discrimination cases, has the state deliberately violated federal
policy (acted out of its own self-interest, fiscal or otherwise) or has
the violation either been "inadvertent" or a matter of legitimate dispute as to the meaning of the federal requirement? There are undoubtedly other considerations that ought to be accounted for in determining whether the relief prescribed72 by Congress, be it
retrospective or prospective, is too intrusive.
Therefore, I come out somewhere between the majority and dissent in Alden. The majority's position that Article I never justifies an
individual's private right of action against the state is supported only
by its reading of history, a reading that at best is open to debate.
That is hardly the stuff of firm constitutional rules. History aside,
with all of the rhetoric about acceptable balances and accommodations, the Court adopts an analytical method that does everything but
balance or accommodate. On the other hand, I am equally troubled
by the dissent's claim that Article I automatically trumps a state's
72. To use Alden as an example, it is not clear that my proposal would alter
the result. First it appears that Maine did not simply ignore the federal regulations. Rather, the state argued that probation officers were either professional
employees (exempted from the act) or fell within a regulation that computed
overtime differently for law enforcement personnel. Neither argument seems
unreasonable nor pretextual. See Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D. Me.
1993). But cf Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551, 554-55 (D. Me. 1994) (holding that Maine was liable for liquidated damages because it failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the applicability of the FLSA regulations). Moreover, once the district court ruled, Maine conformed its policies to those of the
Department of Labor. See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1997). On
the other hand, Congress did declare that agency remedies would be insufficient to ensure the uniform application of the FLSA. Moreover, one would
have to, in some way, assess the significance of the state's monetary exposure,
given that it was apparently acting in good faith, against the monetary consequence to the individual officers of not being made whole, again accounting
for the fact that Maine is now paying them according to the federal regulations.
My tentative conclusion is to place more weight on the individual because of
the statute's evident purpose and Congress's findings regarding the enforcement mechanisms. Moreover, any financial consequence to the state can be
widely distributed either through the tax system or through private labor negotiations or both. But I can be persuaded otherwise. Under the Court's analysis,
however, it is fruitless even to engage in such a conversation.
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interest in sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment any
more than it does under the Tenth Amendment. The dissent fails to
recognize that subjecting a state to judicial process can, depending
on the remedy, be as much an enemy of the states' governance role
as the declaration of the states' obligation. Finally, both the majority
and the dissent forget that the individual and her dignity are as much
involved in these so-called institutional disputes as which level of
government should be exercising what power.
Numerous objections can be made to an analytical approach to
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity that balances state and individual "dignity interests." I will mention only three. First, and
least important, it would both abolish the constitutional doctrine of
sovereign immunity as we know it and overrule a precedent that we
have come to live with for 110 years. The answers are "yes" and
"not necessarily." The "yes" answer must, however, be qualified.
The Court itself has altered the sovereign immunity doctrine by argning that it does not stand alone but is only an element, albeit a necessary element, of a broader principle of state autonomy. All I am
suggesting is that the Court justify that additional dimension to sovereign immunity with something other than fiat. As to the second
answer, Hans need not necessarily be overruled. It can be distinguished from cases like Alden and Seminole Tribe. In the latter
cases, Congress had made a specific declaration that a private right
of action to enforce its constitutionallypermissible policy was necessary to the statutory scheme. That conclusion certainly deserves
some deference. In Hans, on the other hand, federal judicial author73
ity was based on a general grant of federal question jurisdiction.
Second, one might claim that what I suggest simply will not
work. How can the Court, in an ad hoc, case-by-case manner determine whether the specific private remedy prescribed by Congress
does or does not intrude too deeply into the states' autonomy? There
are three answers. To begin with, the Court has already done so by
stating that Congress upsets the appropriate balance between federal
supremacy and state sovereignty/autonomy by creating a private
damage action against the states. No reliance on "Framer's intent"
(i.e., "we didn't say it, they did") can alter that initial balancing
73. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
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conclusion unless one dismisses out of hand the dissent's history and
the near unanimous conclusions of every scholar who has studied the
founding era. With all due respect, the Court is using interpretation
of ambiguous historical data as a cover for its sub rosa balancing. In
addition, the Court is perfectly willing to engage in explicit ad hoc
balancing when it suits its purposes to do so. In Idaho v. Couer
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho,74 both Justice Kennedy's principal opinion
and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion use ad hoc balancing, in
one form or another, to determine whether to create yet another exception to Ex parte Young. 75 My suggestion would simply change
the analytical point at which the Court balances. My argument is
that balancing ought to occur at the initial stage, when the question is
whether the state ought to be able to assert its immunity, rather than
at the end stage, when the question is whether a state's interest is sufficiently important that suits for prospective relief against state officers should nevertheless be precluded. Finally, there is a whole body
of law on federal preemption that is based on what the Court can
glean, by looking at statutes one-by-one, about the strength of Congressional policy when compared to the interests of the states in concurrent regulation. Looking at the intrusiveness of Congress's remedy, case-by-case, does not differ significantly from that inquiry.
The third objection is that what I propose significantly increases
judicial discretion and therefore decreases certainty. As such it poses
a separate threat to federalism and, indeed, to the rule of law itself. I
will only make two brief points. First, for me it is more important to
be right than to be certain. And while case-by-case balancing does
not ensure correctness, in my judgment it stands a far better chance
than a categorical and unalterable constitutional rule
that, of neces76
sity, treats different cases as if they were the same.
Second, as noted above, the Court's conclusion that sovereign
immunity always trumps Congress's Article I powers, assumes that,
on balance, both the federal system and the individuals served by

74. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
75. See id. at 270-80; id. at 288-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

76. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a PrincipledInterpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 31-33 (1998) (arguing
that formalism's bright-line rules have better consequences than functionalism's balancing tests in the context of the Commerce Clause power).
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that system are better off by preserving the states' immunity from
private law suits than by permitting individuals to be recompensed
for past violations by the states of their federal constitutional or
statutory rights. The Court does not tell us explicitly either how it
measures "betteroffness" or why the balance comes out that way.
But if you believe that federalism first and foremost protects individual liberty, the Court's result is certainly ironic (to put it mildly).
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